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Is Africa a Net Creditor? 
New Estimates of Capital Flight from Severely Indebted Sub-Saharan 
African Countries, 1970-1996 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper presents estimates of capital flight from 25 low-income sub-Saharan African 
countries in the period 1970 to 1996.  Capital flight totaled more than $193 billion (in 
1996 dollars); with imputed interest earnings, the accumulated stock of flight capital 
amounts to $285 billion.  The combined external debt of these countries stood at $178 
billion in 1996.  Taking capital flight as a measure of private external assets, and 
calculating net external assets as private external assets minus public external debts, 
sub-Saharan Africa thus appears to be a net creditor vis-à-vis the rest of the world.  
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1. Introduction 
The title of this paper will strike some as fanciful.  Africa, a net creditor?  Surely 
not.  Or at least, surely not the low-income countries of sub-Saharan Africa, to whom the 
prefix ‘heavily indebted’ is routinely applied.  For the past two decades, these countries 
have been forced by their crippling external debt burdens to undertake painful economic 
adjustments, while devoting scarce foreign exchange to debt-service payments.  Of 38 
countries worldwide classified by the World Bank as ‘severely indebted low-income 
countries’ (SILICs) in 1998, 29 were in sub-Saharan Africa.1 
 
There is a crucial difference, however, between countries and governments.  
Countries include private sectors as well as public sectors.  Without exception, sub-
Saharan African governments are indeed indebted, often severely so.  But this does not 
necessarily mean that all the countries of the region are indebted, if a country is 
understood to comprise private citizens as well as their governments. 
 
It is well-known, for example, that even as the governments they headed incurred 
large external debts, a number of individual African rulers amassed large personal 
fortunes, at least part of which were held abroad.  Mobutu Sese Seko, who ruled Congo 
(or Zaire, as he renamed it) from 1965 to 1997, is reported to have accumulated $4 billion 
in private assets by the mid-1980s (Burns et al., 1997).  The Swiss bank accounts of the 
family of General Sani Abacha, who ruled Nigeria for five years, frozen in 1999 at the 
request of a new Nigerian government, reportedly contain as much as $2 billion (Onishi, 
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1999); a US Senate inquiry in the same year revealed that the Abacha family also held 
multi-million dollar accounts with Citibank in London and New York (Gerth, 1999; 
O’Brien, 1999). 
 
The problem is that while public external debts are scrupulously recorded, many 
private external assets are scrupulously concealed.  This makes it is difficult to compare 
them so as to arrive at a complete picture of a country’s net external balance, taking into 
account the private sector as well as the public sector. 
 
In this essay, we provide an estimate of this balance for the ‘severely indebted’ 
low-income countries of sub-Saharan Africa.  To estimate private external assets, we use 
capital flight estimation techniques first developed in the mid-1980s by researchers at the 
World Bank and elsewhere (for an overview of these methods, see Lessard and 
Williamson, 1987).  The starting point for our statistical detective work is the official 
Balance of Payments Statistics published annually by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), where discrepancies between recorded inflows and outflows of foreign exchange 
are reported as ‘net errors and omissions.’  
 
Capital flight researchers recognized that the official balance-of-payments (BoP) 
data conceal two further sources of errors.  First, in the capital account, the recorded 
inflows of external borrowing are often considerably smaller than the corresponding 
amounts shown in the World Bank’s World Debt Tables, implying that the BoP data on 
debt flows are incomplete.  Second, in the current account the accuracy of the official 
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BoP data on the value of exports and imports is undermined by widespread trade 
misinvoicing, motivated among other reasons by the desire to evade import restrictions or 
customs duties, and by the desire to evade controls on transferring foreign exchange out 
of the country.  The extent of misinvoicing can be estimated by trading partner data 
comparisons, using data in the IMF’s annual Direction of Trade Statistics. 
 
After correcting the BoP data for underreported external borrowing and in some 
cases for trade misinvoicing, researchers recalculated net errors and omissions, thereby 
obtaining a ‘residual’ measure of capital flight (see, for example, World Bank, 1985; 
Erbe, 1985; Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, 1986; Lessard and Williamson, 1987).  
Summing annual capital flight over time, we can obtain a measure of private external 
assets, which can be compared to the host country’s public external debts. 
 
Following this methodology, we calculate capital flight for 25 sub-Saharan 
African countries for all the years from 1970 to 1996 for which the necessary data are 
available.  Our 25-country sample consists of those countries classified by the World 
Bank as ‘severely indebted low-income countries’ for much of the past decade, for which 
adequate data are available.2  Our results indicate that in many of these countries – 
including Angola, Cameroon, Congo-Zaïre, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Zambia – private 
external assets accumulated via capital flight exceed the public external debt.  In the 
region as a whole, whereas the total external debts of the 25 countries stood at $178 
billion in 1996, their cumulative capital flight amounted to $193 billion in 1996 dollars, 
or to $285 billion if the imputed interest earnings on flight capital are included in the 
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total.  Depending on which of these two measures of the stock of capital flight is used, it 
exceeded the stock of debt by $14.5 billion to $106.5 billion.  Contrary to the common 
wisdom, the answer to the question in our title is ‘Yes.’ 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the 
existing literature on capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa, noting several limitations of 
previous estimates.  Section 3 presents new estimates of African capital flight from 1970 
to 1996, incorporating adjustments for trade misinvoicing.  We sum these estimates over 
time to obtain two alternative measures of the cumulative stock of capital flight: a 
conservative estimate adjusted only for inflation, and a more comprehensive estimate 
which includes imputed interest earnings.  In Section 4, we compare these estimates to 
the external public debts of these countries.  Finally, in Section 5 we offer some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Past Evidence on African Capital Flight 
 Beginning in the mid-1980s, the phenomenon of capital flight from developing 
countries received considerable attention in the economics literature.  A number of 
country-specific case studies and cross-country studies have examined the magnitude of 
capital flight, its causes, and its effects (see, among others, Morgan Guarantee Trust Co., 
1986; Lessard and Williamson, 1987; Pastor, 1990; Boyce, 1992; Murinde, Hermes, and 
Lensink, 1996; Ajayi, 1997).  Until recently, however, sub-Saharan Africa has received 
less attention than other developing regions.   
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 Yet capital outflows from African economies deserve serious attention for several 
reasons.  First, capital flight constitutes a diversion of scarce resources away from 
domestic investment and other productive activities.  In recent decades, African 
economies have achieved significantly lower investment levels than other developing 
countries (International Financial Corporation, 1998; Ndikumana, 2000).  These low 
levels of domestic investment are attributable, in part, to the apparent scarcity of 
domestic savings, weak and shallow financial systems, and high country risk due to 
unstable macroeconomic and political conditions.  Capital flight is both a cause and a 
symptom of this weak investment performance. 
 
 Second, capital flight is likely to have pronounced regressive effects on the 
distribution of wealth.  The individuals who engage in capital flight generally are 
members of the subcontinent’s economic and political élites, who take advantage of their 
privileged positions to acquire and channel funds abroad.  Both the acquisition and the 
transfer of funds often involve legally questionable practices, including the falsification 
of trade documents (trade misinvoicing), the embezzlement of export revenues, and 
kickbacks on public and private sector contracts (see, for example, Ndikumana and 
Boyce, 1998).  The negative effects of the resulting shortages of revenue and foreign 
exchange fall disproportionately on the shoulders of the less wealthy members of the 
society.  The regressive impact of capital flight is compounded when financial 
imbalances result in devaluation: the wealthy who hold external assets are insulated from 
its effects, while the poor enjoy no such cushion. 
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 A third reason for greater attention to African capital flight is that most sub-
Saharan African countries remain in the grip of a severe external debt crisis.  Debt service 
today absorbs a sum equivalent to more than 6% of sub-Saharan’s GDP.3  Insofar as the 
proceeds of external borrowing were used not to the benefit of the African public, but 
rather to finance the accumulation of private external assets by the ruling élites, the moral 
and legal legitimacy of these debt-service obligations is open to challenge. 
 
Quantitative studies 
 Past studies have revealed significant capital outflows from sub-Saharan African 
countries since the 1970s.  The estimated magnitudes of capital flight have varied, 
primarily due to differences in data and time-period coverage.  The standard 
methodology is to calculate capital flight as the residual difference between capital 
inflows and recorded foreign-exchange outflows.  Capital inflows consist of net external 
borrowing plus net foreign direct investment.  Recorded foreign-exchange outflows 
comprise the current account deficit and net additions to reserves and related items.  The 
difference between the two constitutes the measure of capital flight.  If the sole source of 
data for this calculation were the official balance-of-payments statistics, this would be 
equivalent to the ‘net errors and omissions’ reported therein.  In practice, more accurate 
estimates of the change in external debt outstanding can be obtained from other sources, 
such as the World Bank’s World Debt Tables.  Using this approach, which was 
introduced in pioneering studies by the World Bank (1985) and Erbe (1985), capital flight 
(KF) in a given year t for a country i is thus computed as:  
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)( ititititit RESCADFIDEBTKF ∆+−+∆=      (1) 
where DEBT∆ is the change in total external debt outstanding, DFI is net direct foreign 
investment, CA is the current account deficit, and RES∆  is net additions to the stock of 
foreign reserves.4   
 
In an early cross-country study on capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa, 
prepared for a World Bank volume on African external finance, Chang and Cumby 
(1991) examined a sample of 36 African countries from 1976 to 1987.  They found that 
with the exception of Nigeria, the absolute levels of capital flight from individual African 
countries were smaller than those from Latin American countries, but that relative to 
external debt and GDP, many African countries experienced higher capital flight than 
their Latin American counterparts.   
 
Hermes and Lensink (1992) estimated capital flight from six countries (Congo-
Zaïre, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda) over the period 1976 to 
1989.  They used the somewhat narrower ‘non-bank’ definition proposed by Morgan 
Guaranty Trust (1986), which excludes assets held abroad by domestic banks from the 
definition of capital flight.5  Their estimates again indicate that while total capital flight 
from sub-Saharan African countries may seem small compared to that from Latin 
American countries, the burden of capital flight (as a percent of GDP) is higher: 61% for 
the sub-Saharan sample compared to 22% for Latin America (also see Murinde, Hermes, 
and Lensink, 1996).  By their calculations, Nigeria experienced the largest capital fight 
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over the period, $21 billion, representing 60% of the combined total for the six countries 
in the sample.  Their econometric analysis of the determinants of capital flight indicates 
that the most important explanatory variable is public external borrowing: of each dollar 
of public or publicly-guaranteed long-term borrowing, 75 to 90 cents appears to be ‘re-
exported as capital flight’ (Hermes and Lensink, 1992: 526).  These results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that capital flight and external debt are closely intertwined (Boyce, 
1992, 1993). 
 
Ojo (1992) estimated capital flight from three heavily indebted countries – Côte 
d’Ivoire, Morocco, and Nigeria – from 1975 to 1991.  Cumulative capital flight from the 
two sub-Saharan countries, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria, was found to be very large, at 
$10.9 billion and $35.9 billion, respectively.  The author’s analysis of the determinants of 
capital flight from these countries emphasized the importance of the domestic economic 
environment, including such policy-related variables as the government budget deficit 
and changes in external reserves. 
 
Nyatepe-Coo (1994) estimated capital flight from seven sub-Saharan African 
countries (Congo-Zaïre, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Zambia) in 
the period 1970 to 1992.  The study finds heavy capital outflows from Nigeria, Ghana, 
Congo-Zaïre, and Zambia: relative to external borrowing, capital flight was equivalent to 
91%, 58%, 35%, and 32%, respectively.  For Kenya and Tanzania, by contrast, the 
corresponding ratios were only 9% and 2%, respectively, and for Sierra Leone, estimated 
capital flight was negative (implying unrecorded capital inflows).  The study associates 
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capital flight with political instability, macroeconomic uncertainty, and weak credibility 
of government policies. 
  
In a study of capital flight from severely indebted low-income countries in sub-
Saharan Africa over the period 1980 to 1991, Ajayi (1997) finds that cumulative capital 
flight in the period averaged 40% of external debt for an 18-country sample, and that the 
ratio was as high as 94% for Nigeria and Rwanda, 74% for Kenya, and 60% for Sudan 
(Ajayi, 1997: 17).  Observing that the countries that exhibit the greatest capital flight 
often are also the most highly indebted, Ajayi characterizes these as “twin problems”.  He 
uses trading-partner data comparisons to estimate the net effect of trade misinvoicing, 
which can be added to capital flight as measured in equation (1) to yield an adjusted 
measure.  This results in both upward and downward adjustments of capital flight 
estimates, depending on whether export underinvoicing and import overinvoicing (both 
of which are common mechanisms of capital flight) outweigh import underinvoicing (that 
is, pure or technical smuggling to evade customs duties and restrictions) in the country in 
question. 
 
In addition to these cross-country studies, several studies have focused on capital 
flight from individual African countries.  Smit and Mocke (1991) estimated that capital 
flight from South Africa over the period 1970 to 1988 amounted to between $12 billion 
and $23 billion, depending on the measure used.  They point out that these amounts are 
large on international standards, and that during the late 1970s capital flight from South 
Africa exceeded that from Argentina, Brazil, or the Philippines (Smit and Mocke 1991: 
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107).  Ajayi (1992) estimated capital flight from Nigeria in 1972-1989, drawing 
particular attention to the role of ‘trade faking’ (that is, misinvoicing) in the country’s oil 
sector and to the links between capital flight, corruption, and governance failures.6  
Ndikumana and Boyce (1998) find that from 1968 to 1990, the real stock of capital flight 
from Zaïre amounted to roughly $12 billion (in 1990 dollars), and suggest that capital 
flight was fueled by lax lending practices by foreign banks and multilateral financial 
institutions, as well as by irresponsible debt management and the embezzlement of export 
revenues under the Mobutu regime. 
 
Limitations of past estimates 
 The past estimates of capital flight from Sub-Saharan Africa have several 
important limitations.  First, with a few exceptions (Chang and Cumby, 1991; Ajayi, 
1997), they cover a small number of countries.  Therefore, they do not offer a basis for 
extensive cross-country analyses of the magnitude, causes, and consequences of capital 
flight.  Moreover, those studies which do cover a large sample of countries only refer to a 
fairly short time period, which limits our ability to examine the trends in capital flight 
over time.  For time-series analysis, it would be useful to have estimates of capital flight 
both in the pre-debt crisis years of heavy external borrowing and since the onset of the 
crisis in the 1980s. 
 
 Second, in deriving residual measures of capital flight, past studies have not taken 
into account the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on the U.S. dollar value of end-of-
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year debt stocks.  Depending on whether these currencies depreciate or appreciate against 
the dollar, this can introduce a downward or upward bias in measured capital flight.  This 
problem is especially relevant in countries where a substantial portion of the debt is 
denominated in other currencies, as in the Francophone countries of sub-Saharan Africa, 
where much debt is denominated in the French franc. 
 Third, again with a few exceptions (Chang and Cumby, 1991; Ajayi, 1992, 1997; 
Ndikumana and Boyce, 1998), most past estimates pay no attention to the falsification of 
trade transactions.  Instead they take the trade statistics (unlike the capital account 
statistics) in the official Balance of Payments tables at the face value.  In practice, the 
official BoP data on exports and imports are often of poor quality due to trade 
misinvoicing.  Exporters may understate the value of their export revenues, so as to retain 
abroad the difference between their true value and their declared value.  On the import 
side, there are incentives for both overinvoicing and underinvoicing: overinvoicing 
allows importers to obtain extra foreign exchange, which can then be transferred abroad, 
from the central bank at favorable terms; underinvoicing and outright smuggling allow 
importers to evade customs duties and restrictions.7  Export underinvoicing and import 
overinvoicing both inflate the current account deficit recorded in the balance of 
payments; import underinvoicing leads to understatement of the true deficit.  If the true 
current account deficit is overstated, the capital flight estimate obtained using balance-of-
payments trade data (equation 1) will be too low: further capital flight is hidden in trade 
accounts.  If the true current account deficit is understated, the capital flight estimate will 
be too high:  some of the missing foreign exchange was in fact used to finance 
unrecorded imports.  The net effect of trade misinvoicing can only be ascertained 
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empirically.8  The studies which have considered this issue flight have found that trade 
misinvoicing is a significant net addition to total capital flight in some countries in some 
years (see, for example, Ajayi 1997, and Ndikumana and Boyce 1998). 
 
 Finally, with the exception of the study of Congo-Zaïre by Ndikumana and Boyce 
(1998), none of cumulative estimates of African capital flight reported in past studies 
have taken into account the fact that a dollar which fled in, say, 1976 does not have the 
same value as a dollar which fled 10 or 20 years later.  In principle, dollars which fled at 
different dates can be made comparable either by adjusting for inflation (that is, 
converting nominal dollars into real terms expressed in some constant base-year value) or 
by imputing interest earnings on capital flight which left in earlier years.9  As long as the 
real interest rate is positive, the cumulative stock of flight capital will be higher when 
calculated by the latter method than by the former.  Which method of adjustment of the 
nominal estimates is preferable depends on the intended uses of the data.  If the aim is to 
examine trends, or to analyze econometrically the causes or consequences of capital 
flight, then the inflation-adjusted real estimates are appropriate.  If the aim is to assess the 
opportunity cost of capital flight, or to compare cumulative capital flight to the stock of 
external debt (which, of course, includes capitalized interest arrears and borrowing to 
cover the interest payments), then interest-adjusted estimates are more germane.  
 
3. New Estimates of African Capital Flight 
 In this section, we present the most comprehensive set of estimates of capital 
flight from the “severely indebted low-income countries” (SILICs) of sub-Saharan Africa 
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reported to date.  Our data refer to 25 countries, covering whenever possible the 27-year 
period from 1970 to 1996.  The estimates incorporate adjustments for trade misinvoicing 
and exchange rate fluctuations, the details of which are explained below.  Two sets of 
estimates of cumulative capital flight are presented, one using an inflation adjustment, the 
other using imputed interest earnings.  
 
Sample 
Our sample includes 25 sub-Saharan countries classified as SILICs by the World 
Bank: Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (the former Zaïre), the Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya,10 Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.  
The sample excludes SILICs for which consistent data are not available (Equatorial 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Saõ Tomé and Principe, and Somalia).  The sample also 
excludes sub-Saharan African countries classified as low-income but not as severely 
indebted (Benin, Chad, Comoros, Eritrea, Gambia, Lesotho, Senegal, Togo, and 
Zimbabwe), and those not classified as low-income countries (Botswana, Cape Verde, 
Djibouti, Gabon, Mauritius, Mayotte, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, and 
Swaziland).  The countries in our sample account for 86% of the population, 80% of the 
debt, and 43% of the GDP of all sub-Saharan African countries, and for 92% of the 
population, 91% of the debt, and 93% of the subcontinent’s GDP excluding South 
Africa.11 
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Methodology 
We define capital flight as the difference between total capital inflows and 
recorded foreign exchange outflows.  We calculate capital flight using equation (1) 
above, with three important modifications.12  First, we take into account the impact of 
exchange rate fluctuations on the U.S. dollar value of the stock of long-term debt.  
Second, we take into account trade misinvoicing by means of trading partner data 
comparisons, using the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook for this purpose.  
We thereby obtain nominal capital flight estimates adjusted for trade misinvoicing.  
Third, we compute estimates of adjusted capital flight that either correct for inflation 
(using the US producer price index) or incorporate accumulated interest earnings on past 
capital flight (using the US Treasury Bill rate). 
 
Adjustment for exchange rate fluctuations 
The World Bank’s debt data are reported in a common currency, the U.S. dollar.  
Yet countries hold debts denominated in a variety of currencies (see Table 1).  In the 
World Bank data on debt stocks, these are converted to dollars using the end-of-year 
exchange rate.  In periods of significant fluctuations in the exchange rates of the 
currencies in which the debt is denominated, year-to-year changes in the dollar value of 
the stock of outstanding debt can differ markedly from the actual net flows during the 
year.  If so, estimates of capital flight based on equation (1) will be biased.  For a country 
that held French franc-denominated debt, for example, the depreciation of the French 
franc from 4.0FF/$ at the end of 1979 to 9.6FF/$ at the end of 1984 reduced the dollar 
valuation of this portion of its debt stock.  Estimates of capital flight derived from the 
 15 
apparent change in the debt stock would be correspondingly reduced.  Conversely, when 
other currencies in which debt is denominated appreciate against the dollar, estimates of 
capital flight are inflated. 
 
To correct for these potential discrepancies, we adjust the change in the long-term 
debt stock for fluctuations in the exchange rate of the dollar against other currencies.  
Total debt stock is the sum of long-term debt, short-term debt, and the use of IMF credit.  
IMF credit is denominated in Special Drawing Rights (SDR), while long-term debt and 
short-term debt are denominated in various currencies.  The World Bank’s Global 
Development Finance reports annual data on long-term debt composition for seven major 
currencies: the French franc, the German Deutsche mark, the Japanese yen, the Swiss 
franc, the SDR, the UK pound, and the US dollar (see Table 1).   
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Using these data, we calculate the change in the U.S. dollar value of the debt 
stock carried over from the previous year that is attributable to exchange-rate movements 
in the current year.  We do so by revaluing the beginning-of-year debt stock using end-of-
year exchange rates, and calculating an ‘exchange-rate adjustment’ equal to the 
difference between this number and the beginning-of-year debt stock valued at 
beginning-of-year exchange rates.  This difference is subtracted from DEBT∆  to get an 
adjusted measure, DEBTADJ∆ , that captures the change in the debt stock attributable to 
net borrowing in the period.  In other words, DEBTADJ∆  is the difference between the 
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end-of-year debt stock and the beginning-of-year debt stock, when both are valued at 
end-of-year exchange rates.  The portion of long-term debt held in multiple currencies 
and unspecified currencies is left unadjusted, as is the short-term debt.13 
 
For country i, the U.S. dollar value of the beginning-of-year stock of debt at the 
new exchange rates is obtained as follows: 
1,1,
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where LTDEBT is the total long-term debt; ijα is the proportion of long-term debt held in 
currency j, for each of the six non-US currencies;  EX is the end-of-year exchange rate of 
the currency of denomination against the dollar (expressed as units of currency per U.S. 
dollar); IMFCR is the use of IMF credit; LTOTHER is long-term debt denominated in 
other unspecified currencies; LTMULT is long-term debt denominated in multiple 
currencies; LTUSD is long-term debt denominated in U.S. dollars; and STDEBT is short-
term debt. 
The exchange rate adjustment is obtained as: 
11 −− −= ttt DEBTNEWDEBTERADJ      (3) 
 
We then obtain the adjusted change in debt as:  
ttt ERADJDEBTDEBTADJ −∆=∆       (4) 
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Since 1−−=∆ ttt DEBTDEBTDEBT , it follows that (4) is equivalent to: 
1−−=∆ ttt NEWDEBTDEBTDEBTADJ      (4’) 
 
We modify equation (1) to get a residual measure of capital flight adjusted for 
exchange rate fluctuations: 
)( ititititit RESCADFIDEBTADJKF ∆+−+∆=     (5) 
 
Adjustment for trade misinvoicing  
We estimate trade misinvoicing by comparing the country’s export and import 
data to those of its trading partners.  These are reported in the IMF’s annual publication 
Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook.  We assume that the trade data from 
industrialized countries are relatively accurate, and interpret the discrepancy between 
these and the data from their African trading partners as evidence of misinvoicing. 
 
 For an individual African country i in year t, export discrepancies with the 
industrialized countries (DXIC) are computed as follows: 
)*( tititit CIFXICPXICDXIC −=       (6) 
where PXIC is the value of the industrialized countries’ imports from the African country 
as reported by the industrialized trading partners, XIC is the African country’s exports to 
industrialized countries as reported by the African country, and CIF is the c.i.f/f.o.b 
factor, representing the costs of freight and insurance.14  A positive sign on DXIC 
indicates export underinvoicing.15 
 
 18 
Import discrepancies with the industrialized countries (DMIC) are computed as:  
)*( tititit CIFPMICMICDMIC −=       (7) 
where MIC is the African country’s imports from industrialized countries as reported by 
the African country, and PMIC is the industrialized countries’ exports to the African 
country as reported by the industrialized trading partners.  A positive sign on DMIC 
indicates net overinvoicing of imports; a negative sign indicates net underinvoicing. 
 
 To obtain global totals, we multiply these discrepancies by the inverse of the 
average shares of industrialized countries in the African country’s exports (ICXS) and 
imports ICMS.16  We obtain total trade misinvoicing as the sum of export discrepancies 
and import discrepancies:  
  
i
it
i
it
it ICMS
DMIC
ICXS
DXIC
MISINV +=      (8) 
 
Adding trade misinvoicing to the initial estimate of capital flight from equation 
(5) we obtain adjusted capital flight as: 
  ititit MISINVKFADJKF +=       (9) 
 
Inflation adjustment 
To make annual capital flight estimates comparable over an extended period of 
time, we convert nominal flows to constant dollars, using the US producer price index for 
this purpose.  The resulting data allow us to examine year-to-year changes in the real 
magnitude of capital flight and to compare the values of capital flight to other aggregates, 
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such as the stock of debt or real gross domestic product.  Real capital flight (adjusted for 
trade misinvoicing) is calculated as: 
titit PPIADJKFRADJKF /=        (10) 
where PPI is the US producer price index (base 1996=1.00). 
 
Adjustment for interest earnings 
 Some of the capital that fled African countries was used to finance the acquisition 
of assets abroad, including fixed assets such as real estate, and liquid and semi-liquid 
assets such as savings deposits and stocks.  These assets gain value over time through 
market appreciation or interest earnings: a dollar invested abroad in 1970 is worth more 
than a dollar today due to these accumulated earnings.  No doubt some of the funds 
which fled African countries were used to finance consumption, rather than being 
invested, but there is no easy way to estimate the proportions of capital flight which were 
consumed and saved.  Imputing interest earnings to the entire amount of capital flight 
provides an estimate of its opportunity cost to the nation, on the assumption that this 
capital would have otherwise been available for investment.  We compute the stock of 
interest-earnings adjusted capital flight (SADJKF) as follows: 
  itittiit ADJKFTBILLSADJKFSADJKF ++= − )1(1,    (11) 
where TBILL  is the interest rate on short-term US Treasury bills.17 
 
Results 
 20 
 Table 2 presents our initial capital flight estimates in real US dollars (1996 prices) 
with adjustments for exchange rate fluctuations before adjustments for trade 
misinvoicing.  Since the number of observations is not identical for all countries, due to 
missing data for certain years, cross-country comparisons are best made on the basis of 
the average annual capital flight as opposed to cumulative totals.   For the sample as a 
whole, total capital flight by this measure amounted to $152 billion.  The results show 
wide cross-country variations in the magnitude of capital flight.  Nigeria leads with a 
remarkable $63 billion in capital flight over the 27-year period, or roughly $2.3 billion 
per annum.  Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, and Sudan follow with roughly $1.5 billion, $616 
million, and $513 million per year, respectively.  These results are broadly comparable to 
the findings of other authors who have investigated capital flight for specific countries 
and time periods using the same or similar methodology.18 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
 Table 3 presents summary data on trade misinvoicing, again in real (1996) dollars.  
For most countries in the sample, we find evidence of substantial export underinvoicing: 
exporters appear to understate the true value of their earnings so as to retain funds abroad, 
a well-known mechanism of capital flight.  Nigeria, with more than $16 billion in export 
underinvoicing, again leads the way, followed closely by Congo-Zaïre.  On the import 
side, there are some cases of net overinvoicing – Nigeria again being the most striking 
example – but in most cases imports appear to be, on the whole, underinvoiced: in other 
words, smuggling outweighs import overinvoicing.  Combining export and import 
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misinvoicing, we get a mixed picture: for fifteen countries, the sign of the misinvoicing 
adjustment is positive, meaning net additions to our initial estimates of capital flight; for 
ten it is negative, meaning net subtractions.  For the region as a whole, however, the net 
effect is to add $40.6 billion to our total estimate of capital flight. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
 Our final estimates of capital flight, adjusted for trade misinvoicing, are presented 
in Table 4.  The first column shows total capital flight in real 1996 US dollars; the second 
column shows accumulated capital flight, including imputed interest earnings.  For the 
25-country sample as a whole, real capital flight totaled $193 billion, led by Nigeria with 
$86.8 billion, or nearly 45% of the total.  With imputed interest earnings the accumulated 
stock of capital fight is even larger, since real interest rates were positive in much of the 
period: the stock amounts to $285 billion for the sample as a whole, including $129.6 
billion for Nigeria, $34.7 billion for Côte d’Ivoire, and $22.9 billion for Congo-Zaïre.  
These results suggest that the opportunity cost of capital flight has been high indeed for 
sub-Saharan African countries.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
 Annual data on real capital flight, adjusted for trade misinvoicing, are reported in 
Table A1 in the appendix.  These data will be useful in future analyses of the causes and 
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consequences of capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa.  The data indicate that capital 
flight was not solely a phenomenon of the onset of the debt crisis of the 1980s.  For most 
countries, the amounts of capital flight in the 1970s were non-negligible; indeed, the 
outflows of the 1970s were often comparable to, and in some cases greater than, those of 
the 1980s.  Over the period, a number of countries appear to have experienced episodes 
of capital flight reversal (that is, net outflows followed by net inflows), but outflows more 
than outweigh inflows for all but two countries (Mali and Niger) in the period as a 
whole.19 
 
 To permit more meaningful cross-country comparisons of the magnitude of 
capital flight, given the variations in the sizes of their economies, Table 5 presents 
indicators of capital flight relative to income and population.  The first column shows the 
average ratio of annual capital flight to GDP for each country.  By this measure, Angola, 
Mozambique, and Zambia stand out as having experienced the most serious capital flight, 
equivalent to roughly 19% of GDP for Angola, and 12% of GDP for Mozambique and 
Zambia.20  Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire follow with average capital flight at 8.4% and 7.9% 
of GDP, respectively.  For the sample as a whole, annual capital flight was equivalent, on 
average, to 3.8% of GDP.  The second column reports the ratio of accumulated capital 
flight, with imputed interest earnings, to 1996 GDP.  By this measure, Congo-Zaïre, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Zambia experienced the greatest capital flight, the accumulated 
stock of which was more than four times their national incomes.  In four countries, 
capital flight per capita is more than twice as large as per capita GDP.21  The third 
column shows that on a per capita basis, the total stock of capital flight with imputed 
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interest earnings is highest for Côte d’Ivoire, at more than $2,500, followed by Angola, 
Cameroon, Nigeria, and Zambia, each of which exceeds $1,000 per capita.  For the 
sample as a whole, the cumulative stock of capital flight per capita is roughly $583, more 
than double the region’s per capita income in 1996.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
4.  Balancing the Books:  External Assets and Liabilities 
In this section, we compare the private external assets of the 25 sub-Saharan 
African countries, as measured by their cumulative stock of capital flight, to their public 
external liabilities.  Where the former exceed the latter, the countries (as opposed to their 
governments) can be regarded as net creditors vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
 
To be sure, not all of the capital which fled sub-Saharan Africa between 1970 and 
1996 was saved and invested at normal rates of return.   Some of the flight capital was 
spent on consumption, and some of the savings may have earned sub-normal rates of 
return.22  Hence there may be a gap between our measure of private external assets – that 
is, cumulative capital flight – and the external assets which remain in the hands of private 
Africans today.   Nevertheless, the stock of capital flight provides a suitable basis for 
comparisons with sub-Saharan Africa’s external liabilities, as well as a measure of capital 
flight’s opportunity cost to the source countries.  In terms of uses of funds, public 
external debts likewise include monies channeled to consumption and invested at sub-
normal rates of return.  In terms of claims, it is not evident that the fraction of their 
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‘assets’ which sub-Saharan Africa’s external creditors can expect to recover is any higher 
than the fraction of capital flight which private Africans can now claim.23  In this section, 
we take both external assets and external liabilities at their ‘face value’. 
 
Table 6 presents data on the external debts and net external assets of the 25 sub-
Saharan African countries in our sample.  ‘Net external assets’ are here defined as 
cumulative capital flight minus external debt.  When net external assets are positive, the 
country is a net creditor; when negative, the country is a net debtor.  We report two 
alternative measures of net external assets, corresponding to the two measures of 
cumulative capital flight derived in section 3.  The first measure is more conservative, as 
it is based on the accumulated stock of capital flight in constant 1996 dollars, without 
imputed interest earnings.  In effect, this measure values capital flight from earlier years 
with a real interest rate of zero.  The second and more comprehensive measure, based on 
the stock of capital flight with interest, is arguably more appropriate for comparison with 
the stock of external debt, since the latter includes accumulated interest arrears and 
borrowing to finance interest on past loans.  Both measures of net external assets are 
conservative, however, in one important respect: our estimates of capital flight cover only 
the years 1970 to 1996 (and in some cases, a shorter period), whereas the debt stock 
includes the pre-1970 balance and all subsequent additions to it.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
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By both measures, we find that the 25 ‘severely indebted countries’ taken as a 
group are net creditors.  Even without interest earnings, real capital flight exceeded 
external debt by almost $14.5 billion.  Including the imputed interest earnings on flight 
capital, the net external assets of the 25 countries totaled $106.5 billion.  These amounts 
are equivalent to 10% and 76%, respectively, of these countries’ combined GDP in 1996. 
 
Among the individual countries, nine have positive net external assets.  With 
more than $98 billion by the more comprehensive measure, Nigeria’s net external assets 
amount to $858 per capita, nearly three times the country’s per capita income.  Net 
external assets by this measure are 1.7 times national income for Congo-Zaïre and 
Rwanda, and 1.4 times for Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia. 
 
A noteworthy feature of these results is that the countries with the largest external 
debts appear, in general, to have experienced the most capital flight, when both variables 
are measured relative to national income (see Figure 1).   Simple regressions indicate that 
the debt-to-GDP ratio ‘explains’ 19% of the inter-country variations in the capital flight-
to-GDP ratio.  When we examine the timing of debt inflows and capital flight outflows, 
the two variables again appear to be related.  For the 25-country sample as a whole, the 
Pearson correlation coefficient between annual debt inflows and capital flight (both in 
1996 dollars) is 0.54; using three-year moving averages for both variables, the correlation 
is 0.18 (see Figure 2). 
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
These cross-sectional and time-series relationships suggest the presence of 
linkages between external borrowing and capital flight.  These could include causal 
connections in either direction – from borrowing to capital flight and vice versa – and/or 
links attributable to exogenous variables, such as macroeconomic mismanagement, which 
drove both borrowing and capital flight.24  Analysis of these linkages is a potentially 
fruitful area for further research. 
 
5.  Conclusion:  Who Should Forgive Whom? 
The evidence presented in this essay leads to a startling conclusion: far from 
being heavily indebted, many sub-Saharan African countries are net creditors vis-à-vis 
the rest of the world.  This is because their private external assets, as measured by 
cumulative capital flight, are greater than their public external debts.  For the 25-country 
sample as a whole, external assets exceed external debts by $14.5 billion to $106.5 
billion, depending on whether we count imputed interest earnings on the asset side.  The 
region’s assets are 1.1 to 1.6 times the stock of debts.  For some individual countries, the 
results are even more dramatic:  Nigeria’s external assets are 2.8 times its external debt 
by the conservative measure, and 4.1 times higher when we include imputed interest 
earnings on capital flight. 
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At a minimum, these findings suggest a need for greater precision in discussions 
of sub-Saharan Africa’s external debt burden: instead of ‘severely indebted low-income 
countries,’ or SILICs, we could more accurately speak of ‘severely indebted low-income 
governments,’ or SILIGs.  In analyzing the economic plight of sub-Saharan African 
countries and their people, as distinct from that of their governments, we should not focus 
exclusively on public external liabilities, but also consider the private external assets built 
through capital flight.  Both sides of the coin are deeply implicated in the region’s current 
economic travails. 
 
If sub-Saharan Africa is truly a net creditor, why are so many of its people so 
poor?  The answer, of course, is that the subcontinent’s private external assets belong to a 
narrow, relatively wealthy stratum of its population, while public external debts are borne 
by the populace at large through their governments.  This asymmetry is not only 
regrettable, in that it exacerbates poverty in a region in which many are already 
desperately poor.  It also raises profound questions as to precisely what belongs to whom, 
that is, how rights to external assets and responsibilities for external liabilities are to be 
distributed across the population. 
 
Rights to sub-Saharan Africa’s ‘private’ external assets are by no means clearly 
defined or incontestable.  The fact that the Nigerian government has been able to obtain a 
Swiss court order freezing the bank accounts of General Sani Abacha’s family is but one 
indication of the scope for legal, ethical, and political challenges to the ownership of 
these assets.   Not only did capital flight itself generally violate foreign-exchange controls 
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(hence its omission from the official balance of payments), but in many cases the capital 
itself was acquired by legally dubious means.  
 
Efforts to recover and repatriate illicit private fortunes are one way in which 
African peoples and their governments can attempt to repair the disjuncture between 
public external debts and private external assets.  This is a difficult route, however, since 
it places the burden of proof squarely on the African governments to locate and reclaim 
the money (see, for example, The Financial Times, 1999).  As a result, such efforts offer 
only limited possibilities for easing sub-Saharan Africa’s public external debt burden. 
 
An alternative, complementary strategy would apply the same principles to the 
region’s external liabilities.  Sub-Saharan African governments could inform their 
creditors that outstanding debts will be treated as legitimate if, and only if, the real 
counterparts of the borrowing can be identified.  If the creditors can document where the 
money went, and show when and how it benefited citizens of the borrowing country via 
investment or consumption, then the debt will be regarded as a bona fide external 
obligation of the government (and hence an external asset of the creditor bank or 
government).  But if the fate of the borrowed money cannot be traced, then the present 
African governments must infer that it was diverted into private pockets, and possibly 
into capital flight.  In such cases, it can be argued, the liability for the debt lies not with 
the government, but with the private individuals whose personal fortunes are the real 
counterpart of the debts.   
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In adopting such a strategy, Africans could invoke as a precedent the US 
government’s stance toward the creditors of the erstwhile Spanish colonial regime in 
Cuba after the Spanish-American war, a century ago:  the creditors knew, or should have 
known, the risks they faced when they made the loans to the predecessor regime, and 
they ‘took the chances of the investment.’25  
 
In effect, this strategy would accord equal treatment to Africa’s external assets 
and liabilities.  On both sides of the balance sheet, the burden of proof in realizing the 
face value of external claims would lie with the creditors:  African governments seeking 
to reclaim flight capital, and banks and creditor governments seeking to collect debt-
service payments.  The case for symmetry is reinforced by the past complicity of sub-
Saharan Africa’s external creditors in sustaining the power of corrupt rulers and in 
helping them to spirit their ill-gotten gains abroad.  As The Financial Times  (2000) 
remarks, in an editorial comment on the freezing of General Abacha’s Swiss bank 
accounts, ‘Financial institutions that knowingly channeled the funds have much to answer 
for, acting not so much as bankers but as bagmen, complicit in the corruption that has 
crippled Nigeria.’  The evidence presented here indicates that capital flight from Nigeria 
was simply an egregious example of a more widespread phenomenon in the subcontinent.  
 
In recent years there has been much debate about ‘debt forgiveness.’  Proponents 
argue that, in view of the dire economic circumstances in the low-income countries of 
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sub-Saharan Africa, their external debts should be written off.  Opponents counter that 
debt relief would create a moral hazard, by encouraging undisciplined borrowing in the 
expectation that defaults will not be penalized, and that this in turn would make creditors 
reluctant to lend in the future.   ‘If you have a society based on debt forgiveness,’ World 
Bank president James Wolfensohn told reporters at a February 2000 news conference, 
‘who’s going to invest in debt anymore?  So you really screw up the market’ (United 
Press International, 2000). 
 
Yet moral hazard – the principle that when insured against a risk, people have less 
incentive to take precautions against it – cuts both ways in international financial 
markets.  If external creditors are not held accountable for the economic results when 
their money props up venal rulers, then they too will feel little pressure to lend more 
responsibly in the future.  If creditors enjoy impunity when they look the other way as 
these rulers transform public resources into private external assets, and in some cases 
even abet them in doing so, there is little reason to expect them to act differently in the 
years ahead.  When the stock of capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa exceeds the 
subcontinent’s external debt, and when the asymmetrical treatment of external liabilities 
and assets shelters the gains of a wealthy élite, while burdening millions of the world’s 
poorest people with responsibility for repaying debts from which they derived little if any 
benefit, the market is already, in Mr Wolfensohn’s blunt phrase, ‘screwed up.’  As the 
people of sub-Saharan Africa confront the twin financial legacies of debt and capital 
flight, they may well ask:  Who should forgive whom? 
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NOTES 
 
1  World Bank, World Development Indicators 1998, CD-ROM version.  ‘Low-income 
countries’ were defined as countries with 1996 per capita incomes of $785 or less; 
countries were defined as ‘severely indebted’ when their ratios of debt service to GNP, 
debt service to exports, debt to GNP, debt to exports, and/or interest to exports exceeded 
critical levels.  Similarly, sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 33 of the 41 countries 
classified as ‘heavily indebted poor countries’ (HIPCs) under the joint World Bank-IMF 
initiative of that name (Boote and Thugge, 1999).  
 
2  We thus exclude middle-income countries such as South Africa, and less indebted low-
income countries such as Lesotho and Eritrea. 
 
3  In 1996, total debt service from the 25 countries in our sample amounted to $9.6 
billion; their combined GDP was $140 billion (authors’ computations using data from 
World Development Indicators 2000 and Global Development Finance 2000). 
 
4  For discussions of alternative methods used to compute capital flight, see Lessard and 
Williamson (1987), Boyce (1992), and Ajayi (1997) 
 
5  Hence the amount of capital flight is computed as: 
itititititit BRESCADFIDEBTKF ∆−∆+−+∆= )( where B∆  is the change in the claims of 
domestic banks on foreign banks.   
 
6  Ajayi (1995) compared estimates of Nigerian capital flight using various 
methodologies for the same time period (1972-1989), and found that total capital flight is 
high regardless of the method used.   
 
7  For early discussions of trade misinvoicing, see Bhagwati (1964) and Gulati (1987). 
 
8  Even if the net effect of trade misinvoicing on capital flight estimates were zero, this 
would not necessarily imply that misinvoicing was unimportant as a mechanism of capital 
flight.  It simply would mean that capital flight via export underinvoicing and import 
overinvoicing was offset by capital outflows to finance the undeclared portion of imports.  
Foreign exchange to finance the latter could have been moved abroad by other 
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mechanisms, such as cash transfers and wire transfers (see Boyce, 1993, pp. 282-285, 
294).  
 
9  Pastor (1990) produced estimates of capital flight including interest earnings for a 
sample of Latin American countries. 
 
10  Kenya is classified as a ‘moderately indebted’ low-income country in the World 
Bank’s 1998 and 1999 World Development Indicators, but as severely indebted in 
previous editions.  The country was also included in Ajayi’s (1997) earlier study of the 
sub-Saharan SILICs.  We therefore retained it in our sample as well. 
 
11  These are 1996 figures, computed from data in World Development Indicators 2000. 
 
12  Data on the change in external debt outstanding ( DEBT∆ ) were taken from the World 
Bank’s Global Development Finance 2000; data on all other variables in the equation are 
from the IMF’s Balance-of-Payments Statistics.   
 
13  On average, short-term debt accounts for roughly 14% of total debts for the 25 
countries in our sample in the 1970-96 period.  Data on its currency composition are not 
available. 
 
14  The series for the c.i.f./f.o.b. factor reported in the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics 
Yearbooks are in some cases anomalous both in terms of absolute values and year-to-year 
variations.  For example, the reported c.i.f./f.o.b. factor for Congo-Zaïre is higher than 
that of land-locked Burundi. Hence we use the average factor for each year for Africa as 
a whole in our computations. 
 
15  In general, we would not expect to find a negative sign on DXIC in the absence of 
incentives for overinvoicing of exports (such as export incentive programs).  For 
discussion, see Gulati (1987). 
 
16  In some cases, the data reported in the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks 
show occasional wide, unexplained fluctuations in the shares of industrialized countries 
in some African countries’ exports and imports. In our calculations, we use the average 
shares for each country over the 1970-1996 period. 
 
17  More precisely, TBILL is the annual average of the discount on new issues of three-
month Treasury bills, reported in the IMF's International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 
 
18  Some discrepancies with past estimates are to be expected, due to our adjustment for 
the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on debt stocks and to other methodological 
variations (e.g., some authors exclude banking-sector external assets, as noted above).  In 
addition, we use more recent editions of the Balance of Payments of Payments Statistics 
Yearbook and the Global Development Finance 2000, which incorporate corrections to 
earlier data. 
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19  The negative capital flight reported here for Mali and Niger in the period as a whole is 
anomalous, suggesting the need for further investigation. 
 
20  Here, as throughout this study, the years covered correspond to those reported in Table 
2.  Hence our data for Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia refer to the periods 1985-1996, 
1982-1996, and 1970-1991, respectively. 
 
21  The average annual ratio of capital flight to GDP, shown in column 1, provides a 
better indicator of relative burdens for those countries for which we do not have a 
complete 27-year time series. 
 
22  According to Lessard and Williamson (1987, p. 83), foreign depositors at Swiss banks 
at times have accepted ‘negative interest returns, implying that they were willing to pay a 
substantial premium for confidentiality.’  See also Walter (1987). 
 
23  Official creditors have already written off substantial amounts of African debt.  In 
June 1999, for example, President Jacques Chirac announced that France would cancel $6 
billion worth of debt owed by Africa’s poorest nations (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 1999).  
Commercial banks have sold African debt on the secondary market at a fraction of its 
face value; in 1994, for example, Sudan’s debt traded for as little as six cents on the 
dollar (Corrigan, 1994).  In 1999, the debts of 20 African countries reportedly traded at 
less than 20% of face value (Garrett and Travis 1999, p. 33). 
 
24  For a taxonomy of linkages between debt and capital flight, see Boyce (1992, 1993). 
 
25  For discussion, see Hoeflich (1982) and Ndikumana and Boyce (1998). 
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Table 1: Currency composition of long-term debt: weighted averagesa 1970-1996  
(%) 
Country  UK Pound  French 
franc 
Deutsche 
mark 
Japanese 
yen 
Swiss 
franc 
US dollar SDR Multiple 
currencies 
Other 
currencies 
Angola 1.0 3.7 0.2 0.3 0.3 81.7 0.2 0.8 11.8 
Burkina Faso 0.6 20.2 1.5 0.0 0.0 41.3 1.6 14.4 20.3 
Burundi 0.0 8.6 0.5 1.8 0.2 47.6 2.1 21.3 17.9 
Cameroon 1.8 31.5 14.0 0.2 0.8 14.3 0.1 15.2 22.1 
Central African Republic 0.2 18.0 1.5 0.4 2.9 42.5 5.6 16.2 12.7 
Congo, DRC  1.8 14.8 6.9 3.0 0.2 43.6 0.2 2.8 26.7 
Congo, Rep. 4.8 43.6 2.4 0.2 0.6 21.6 0.6 3.5 22.9 
Côte d’Ivoire 1.0 35.5 4.1 0.8 2.6 23.6 0.5 19.5 12.5 
Ethiopia 0.4 0.1 2.2 0.6 0.1 27.0 0.2 5.9 63.5 
Ghana 6.7 2.4 7.7 6.8 0.2 50.9 0.5 7.9 16.9 
Guinea 2.0 10.9 2.3 1.7 0.5 35.3 0.5 7.1 39.6 
Kenya 9.9 5.9 5.3 9.6 3.6 31.6 0.2 20.7 13.2 
Madagascar 0.1 22.2 4.0 6.7 1.1 42.2 2.4 6.9 14.4 
Malawi 16.5 1.8 1.5 8.0 0.1 44.6 2.3 19.0 6.3 
Mali 5.0 28.4 1.2 0.9 2.9 16.9 0.0 12.5 32.1 
Mauritania 0.5 7.7 1.7 1.6 0.0 36.5 1.8 4.0 46.2 
Mozambique 2.1 10.1 4.6 1.9 0.0 60.0 1.2 5.9 14.3 
Niger 1.0 48.2 0.9 1.6 0.2 26.5 1.7 0.7 19.3 
Nigeria 10.1 8.1 13.8 8.8 0.9 38.6 0.0 12.6 7.0 
Rwanda 0.0 7.0 0.7 1.8 0.0 42.8 4.4 12.2 31.0 
Sierra Leone 4.2 4.5 6.7 6.3 6.8 33.4 7.7 6.7 23.8 
Sudan 4.6 2.9 1.1 2.3 13.4 51.0 0.4 1.9 22.3 
Tanzania 8.8 2.6 2.8 25.6 0.3 27.3 1.9 5.9 24.8 
Uganda 8.3 2.5 1.3 0.9 1.3 54.6 3.2 17.2 10.8 
Zambia 7.8 2.7 9.8 8.3 0.3 33.1 0.3 14.3 23.4 
Total  5.0 13.1 6.2 5.3 2.0 37.7 0.6 10.0 20.1 
 
Source: Authors’ computations from Global Development Finance 2000 (CDROM edition). 
a  Averages for the 27-year period weighted by total long-term debt. 
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Table 2: Estimates of total real capital flight without adjustment for trade 
misinvoicing 
(million 1996 US $) 
 
Country Total capital flight Annual average Period 
Angola 18237.0 1519.7 1985-1996 
Burkina Faso 35.1 1.4 1970-1994 
Burundi 43.0 3.6 1985-1996 
Cameroon 5335.4 197.6 1970-1996 
Central African Republic 86.1 3.4 1970-1994 
Congo (DRC – Zaïre) 5990.5 221.9 1970-1996 
Congo (Rep.) -466.1 -17.9 1971-1996 
Côte d’Ivoire 16639.2 616.3 1970-1996 
Ethiopia 10143.4 375.7 1970-1996 
Ghana 3433.5 127.2 1970-1996 
Guinea 602.3 54.8 1986-1996 
Kenya 400.4 14.8 1970-1996 
Madagascar 1670.9 61.9 1970-1996 
Malawi -1170.5 -46.8 1970-1994 
Mali -772.3 -28.6 1970-1996 
Mauritania 631.9 27.5 1973-1995 
Mozambique 5526.7 368.4 1982-1996 
Niger -978.6 -37.6 1970-1995 
Nigeria 63181.5 2340.1 1970-1996 
Rwanda -12.1 -0.4 1970-1996 
Sierra Leone -248.9 -9.6 1970-1995 
Sudan 13854.4 513.1 1970-1996 
Tanzania 1693.0 62.7 1970-1996 
Uganda 2889.5 107.0 1970-1996 
Zambia 
 
5807.1 264.0 1970-1991 
Total 152552.4 269.6  
 
Sources: Authors’ computations using data from: 
- World Bank, Global Development Finance 2000 (CD-ROM edition); 
- World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000 (CD-ROM edition); 
- IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook (various issues); 
- IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (various issues). 
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Table 3: Total trade misinvoicing, 1970-1996a,b 
(million 1996 US $) 
 
Country  Export 
misinvoicing 
Import 
misinvoicing 
Net 
misinvoicing 
Annual  
average 
Angola -743.7 -460.7 -1204.5 -100.4 
Burkina Faso 869.0 361.4 1230.4 49.2 
Burundi 797.0 -21.1 775.9 64.7 
Cameroon 10778.3 -3014.3 7764.0 287.6 
Central African Republic 353.6 -189.5 164.1 6.6 
Congo (DRC – Zaïre) 14478.1 -7080.7 7397.4 274.0 
Congo (Rep.) 3669.6 -2744.3 925.3 35.6 
Côte d’Ivoire 8884.3 -2152.5 6731.8 249.3 
Ethiopia 757.8 -5378.4 -4620.6 -171.1 
Ghana -218.3 -2807.8 -3026.1 -112.1 
Guinea -127.5 -132.1 -259.5 -23.6 
Kenya 6207.2 -5792.5 414.7 15.4 
Madagascar 1522.9 -1544.9 -22.0 -0.8 
Malawi -259.2 2134.7 1875.6 75.0 
Mali -96.2 -335.1 -431.3 -16.0 
Mauritania 1265.6 -766.7 498.9 21.7 
Mozambique 1.2 -216.6 -215.4 -14.4 
Niger -632.3 -1542.1 -2174.5 -83.6 
Nigeria 16255.8 7324.6 23580.4 873.3 
Rwanda 657.1 1470.9 2128.0 78.8 
Sierra Leone 2725.2 -1003.6 1721.6 66.2 
Sudan 2323.8 -9195.5 -6871.7 -254.5 
Tanzania 1810.0 -1803.9 6.1 0.2 
Uganda -976.5 241.9 -734.6 -27.2 
Zambia 
 
1123.9 3692.4 4816.3 218.9 
Total 71426.7 -30956.4 40470.3 60.5 
 
Sources: Authors’ computations using data from: 
- IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (various issues); 
- IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (various issues). 
 
Notes: 
a Data refer to the same time periods indicated in Table 2. 
b A positive sign for misinvoicing represents a net addition to capital flight (see text). 
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Table 4: Total real capital flight adjusted for trade misinvoicing a 
(million 1996 US $) 
 
Country Real capital flightb With imputed  
interest earningsc 
Angola 17032.5 20405.0 
Burkina Faso 1265.5 1896.6 
Burundi 818.9 980.9 
Cameroon 13099.4 16906.0 
Central African Republic 250.2 459.0 
Congo (DRC – Zaïre) 13387.8 22990.5 
Congo (Rep.) 459.2 1254.0 
Côte d’Ivoire 23371.0 34745.5 
Ethiopia 5522.8 8017.9 
Ghana 407.3 289.3 
Guinea 342.8 434.2 
Kenya 815.1 2472.6 
Madagascar 1649.0 1577.5 
Malawi 705.1 1174.8 
Mali -1203.6 -1527.2 
Mauritania 1130.8 1830.0 
Mozambique 5311.3 6206.9 
Niger -3153.1 -4768.9 
Nigeria 86761.9 129661.0 
Rwanda 2115.9 3513.9 
Sierra Leone 1472.8 2277.8 
Sudan 6982.7 11613.7 
Tanzania 1699.1 6203.4 
Uganda 2154.9 3316.1 
Zambia 
 
10623.5 13131.2 
Total 193022.8 285061.7 
 
Sources: Authors’ computations using data from: 
- IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (various issues); 
- IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (various issues); 
- World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000, (CD-ROM edition); 
- World Bank, Global Development Finance 2000  (CD-ROM edition). 
 
Notes: 
a Data refer to the same time periods indicated in Table 2. 
b Converted to 1996 US dollars using the United States producer price index (PPI). 
c Includes imputed interest earnings at the United States Treasury Bill rate. 
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Table 5: Per capita capital flight relative to GDP 
 
Country Average 
annual capital 
flight  
(% of GDP) 
Accumulated capital flighta,b 
(with interest earnings) 
GDP per 
capita  
1996b 
  % of 1996 GDP Per capita ($) 
 
 
Angola 19.2 267.8 1803 673 
Burkina Faso 2.5 96.5 194 201 
Burundi 5.6 108.9 156 143 
Cameroon 3.9 185.6 1248 672 
Central African 
Republic 
1.4 50.8 143 281 
Congo (DRC – Zaïre) 3.2 391.7 508 130 
Congo (Rep.) -1.0 49.6 476 959 
Côte d’Ivoire 7.9 324.7 2502 770 
Ethiopia 5.9 133.4 138 103 
Ghana 0.4 4.2 17 395 
Guinea 1.1 11.0 64 586 
Kenya 0.5 26.8 89 330 
Madagascar 2.0 39.5 115 291 
Malawi 2.4 93.8 124 132 
Mali -2.0 -57.5 -153 266 
Mauritania 4.7 167.4 786 469 
Mozambique 12.2 218.4 382 175 
Niger -4.9 -247.7 -521 210 
Nigeria 8.4 367.3 1132 308 
Rwanda 4.3 249.9 522 209 
Sierra Leone 4.7 257.1 505 196 
Sudan 1.6 161.1 428 265 
Tanzania -2.5 106.3 203 191 
Uganda 3.1 54.8 168 306 
Zambia 
 
12.0 354.9 1637 461 
Total 3.8 203.8 583 286 
 
Sources: Authors’ computations using data from: 
- IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (various issues); 
- IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (various issues); 
- World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000 (CD-ROM edition); 
- World Bank, Global Development Finance 2000 (CD-ROM edition). 
Notes: a Cumulative capital flight includes imputed interest earning at the United States Treasury Bill rate. 
b The values for cumulative capital flight and real GDP are for 1996 except for some countries whose 
capital flight series end before 1996.  The relevant years for these countries are: 1994 for Burkina Faso, 
Central African Republic, and Malawi; 1995 for Mauritania, Niger, and Sierra Leone; and 1991 for 
Zambia. 
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Table 6:  External debt and net external assets  
(million 1996 US $) 
 
Country Debt stock 
(1996) 
Net external assets 
  Real capital flight 
minus debt stock 
Cumulative capital 
flight (with interest) 
minus debt stock 
 
Angola 11225.1 5807.4 9179.9 
Burkina Faso 1196.1 69.4 700.4 
Burundi 1126.9 -308.0 -146.0 
Cameroon 9541.6 3557.8 7364.4 
Central African 
Republic 
941.1 -691.0 -482.1 
Congo (DRC- Zaïre) 12826.4 561.4 10164.1 
Congo (Rep.) 5240.6 -4781.4 -3986.6 
Côte d’Ivoire 19523.6 3847.4 15221.9 
Ethiopia 10078.6 -4555.8 -2060.7 
Ghana 6442.2 -6034.9 -6152.9 
Guinea 3240.3 -2897.5 -2806.1 
Kenya 6931.0 -6115.9 -4458.4 
Madagascar 4145.8 -2496.8 -2568.3 
Malawi 2146.1 -1441.0 -971.3 
Mali 3006.0 -4209.6 -4533.2 
Mauritania 2404.2 -1273.4 -572.2 
Mozambique 7566.3 -2255.0 -1359.4 
Niger 1623.3 -4776.3 -6392.1 
Nigeria 31406.6 55355.3 98254.4 
Rwanda 1043.1 1072.8 2470.8 
Sierra Leone 1205.1 267.6 1072.7 
Sudan 16972.0 -9989.3 -5358.3 
Tanzania 7361.8 -5662.7 -1158.4 
Uganda 3674.4 -1519.5 -358.3 
Zambia 
 
7639.4 2984.1 5491.8 
Total 178507.6 14515.1 106556.1 
 
Sources: Authors’ computations using data from: 
- IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (various issues); 
- IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (various issues); 
- World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000, (CD-ROM edition); 
- World Bank, Global Development Finance 2000, (CD-ROM edition). 
Notes: 
The values for cumulative capital flight and debt stock are for 1996 except for some countries whose 
capital flight series end before 1996.  The relevant years for these countries are: 1994 for Burkina Faso, 
Central African Republic, and Malawi; 1995 for Mauritania, Niger, and Sierra Leone; and 1991 for 
Zambia.
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Table A1: Real capital flight, 1970-1996 
(adjusted for trade misinvoicing; million 1996 US $) 
 
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Angola NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Burkina Faso 50.4 49.3 15.1 19.6 122.1 -46.4 -14.1 105.6 167.6 36.2 139.5 
Burundi NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Cameroon -84.7 -31.6 -267.7 -474.6 -21.7 144.4 -110 462.7 128.1 -392.8 232.1 
Central African 
Republic 
-15.3 17.4 21.4 76.2 -4.5 -7.2 31.5 -25.7 -25 -11.1 -10.1 
Congo DRC 801.6 263.8 849.9 1907.2 1534.9 99.8 465.3 -1567.2 2002.9 771.9 916.1 
Congo Rep. NA -51.4 -11.5 116.9 -231.5 -494.3 -853.3 -60.5 253 234.4 439.6 
Côte d’Ivoire 267 306.2 388.2 481 244.4 853.5 576.5 1969.2 1404.6 260.5 1323.6 
Ethiopia 31.9 -10.2 -530.7 78.8 -97.5 -76.7 -217.5 -113.2 17.6 -106.9 -168.1 
Ghana -53.3 -294.1 317.8 370.4 -610.4 133.3 -370.2 114.4 -37.3 110.4 304.3 
Guinea NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Kenya 36.4 90.4 84.1 412.1 526.6 449.4 345.8 84.6 190.8 -38.4 77.9 
Madagascar 22.6 1381.2 270.4 -82.7 655.4 180.7 -1327.7 1424.4 -1170 -85.1 -300.1 
Malawi 11.1 88.5 -35.4 161.9 143.2 192.9 161.1 156.7 52.7 -352.1 -63 
Mali 58.2 -88.9 51.2 80 50.4 -62.2 -131.6 -35.2 -2.2 -230.8 58.5 
Mauritania NA NA NA 304.1 408.6 -214.8 230.6 57.4 75.5 -106.7 4.1 
Mozambique NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Niger 55.2 62.4 83.1 104.2 -180.8 -193.8 -320.4 -321.6 1 -478.5 88.1 
Nigeria -485.1 -564.2 626.1 3634.8 1448.2 1857.7 4162.4 9022.8 4060.4 -612.9 2093.1 
Rwanda -106.1 30.7 24.7 34.4 34.9 67.7 77 119 288.7 320.9 223.8 
Sierra Leone 42.9 236 32.6 299 185.3 -26.8 92.8 92.2 3.7 29.3 57.1 
Sudan 45.3 107.2 -226.8 115.8 673.8 270.5 307.4 206.3 -215.7 545.2 1004.1 
Tanzania 300.9 2985.2 -104.8 790.6 822.7 582.9 450.2 402.6 387 -367.3 402.4 
Uganda 213.2 67.9 6.2 136.7 64.1 -23.3 51.8 -306.3 -90.7 325.2 70.4 
Zambia 1386.4 1328.7 104.4 260.7 -393.4 104.3 84.3 605.2 455.5 944.3 -274.6 
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Table A1 (continued): Real capital flight, 1970-1996 
(adjusted for trade misinvoicing; million 1996 US $) 
 
 
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Angola NA NA NA NA 2452 724.2 2803.8 533.4 1144.7 731.9 
Burkina Faso 86.9 79.8 55.9 48.5 -47 52.7 36.5 -7.3 23.1 77.8 
Burundi NA NA NA NA 82.7 103.5 181.2 20.6 34.4 -5.1 
Cameroon 222.6 329.6 629.2 1900 -244 2166.4 1271.3 427.8 1371 1083.3 
Central African Republic 132.3 62.6 42.4 51.3 28.4 1.5 44.2 28.7 -36 -104.1 
Congo DRC 1715.9 530 289.2 -79.8 778.2 366.4 514.7 -585.6 -292.2 1107.9 
Congo Rep. -240.5 623.2 392.2 690.4 688.5 -326.8 886.8 -390.2 215.6 -177.8 
Côte d’Ivoire 289.6 969.5 183.3 212.7 701 1015.2 1718.5 1033.7 1375.9 2703.4 
Ethiopia 772.2 1649.2 618.8 185.6 707.6 421.3 1340 -471.1 -270.9 425.1 
Ghana -638.9 100.9 422.4 464 -77 -489.6 387.2 -333.5 301.5 59.4 
Guinea NA NA NA NA NA 120.1 217.9 48.4 -328 171.9 
Kenya -331.4 -123.7 241.3 -431.3 625 -259.4 567.4 -310.3 -333.8 316.7 
Madagascar -408.2 -72 -156.9 190.7 -14.4 92.1 314.2 -110 -479.2 -69.2 
Malawi -30.5 -4.8 88.5 -89.4 141.1 149.4 177 142.4 326 55.2 
Mali 70.4 30 83.7 201.3 -145.6 -282.6 -121.5 -310.3 -169.7 65.9 
Mauritania -28.8 80.9 101.7 127.8 82.6 -61.5 2.7 -21.9 -150.1 115.9 
Mozambique NA -398.3 -110.9 830.1 1373.8 121.8 84.3 -299 -223.5 175.7 
Niger -185 -364.7 29.4 49 15 -92.3 -209.9 -131.5 -533.5 44.2 
Nigeria 9293.6 -509.4 2836.1 341.2 2443.8 5835.9 5762.2 2164.5 2314.7 5105.5 
Rwanda -24.4 42.4 32.4 77 89.5 131.5 153.9 153.9 15.3 133.5 
Sierra Leone 72.3 -158.8 78.6 31.6 -34 56.2 91.7 21.8 20.2 13.6 
Sudan 303.7 -182.8 -97 1405.1 398.2 -161.8 599.1 61.5 2192.5 845.8 
Tanzania 689.9 166 490.1 176 1416.6 -6458.6 -305.1 217.5 -365.1 -65.6 
Uganda 219 197.8 178.5 260.8 35 76.4 329.8 -207.2 -10.5 142.4 
Zambia 914.2 -493.1 41.1 284.8 274.6 1099.4 830.1 825.9 1488.2 743.9 
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Table A1 (end): Real capital flight, 1970-1996 
(adjusted for trade misinvoicing; million 1996 US $) 
 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Angola 2002.7 1820.7 1438 1526.2 1566.9 288 
Burkina Faso -40.6 139.7 87.6 26.9 NA NA 
Burundi 23.8 63.9 86.9 49.7 203.5 -26.4 
Cameroon 815.1 1545.1 426.8 820.6 421.4 329.2 
Central African Republic 70.5 -89 -24.9 -5.2 NA NA 
Congo DRC 571.6 421.8 242.6 109.5 664.6 -1013.3 
Congo Rep. -82.3 353.2 38.9 -372.7 255.4 -1435.9 
Côte d’Ivoire 1758.9 1314.3 1570.5 -1574.5 1429.4 594.8 
Ethiopia 380.8 395.8 263.4 452.5 71.5 -226.3 
Ghana -358.3 144.9 -224.2 196.3 84.5 382.5 
Guinea 21 -55.7 243.9 64.3 -73.6 -87.4 
Kenya -6.8 -263.7 -194.1 -205.3 -15.9 -719.3 
Madagascar 416.8 298.3 103.6 286.1 451 -163.1 
Malawi -181.8 -180.6 -109.5 -295.6 NA NA 
Mali -83.4 255.6 -51.3 -429.3 68.6 -132.8 
Mauritania 14.4 -249.5 169.5 61.6 126.4 NA 
Mozambique 191.5 709.9 336.2 2201.4 63 255.4 
Niger -370.3 57.2 -70 -170.6 -118.9 NA 
Nigeria 8387.7 5688.6 4066.9 2851.8 1475.5 3459.9 
Rwanda 103.6 2.7 -29.9 -37.6 81.6 74.6 
Sierra Leone 215.6 310 102.6 31.8 -424.5 NA 
Sudan -199.8 122.6 154.6 82.6 -198.6 -1176.1 
Tanzania -437.4 -256.6 -282.7 66.6 12 -17.1 
Uganda 41 70.5 54 250.8 24.9 -23.3 
Zambia 8.6 NA NA NA NA NA 
Sources: Authors’ computations using data from: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (various issues); IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 
(various issues); World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000 (CD-ROM edition); World Bank, Global Development Finance 2000  (CD-ROM edition). 
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Figure 1: Accumulated capital flight (with interest earnings) and debt stock, 1996 
(% of GDP)
Linear fit:   KF = 1.077DEBT - 12.224
R2 = 0.19
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Figure 2: Real capital flight and debt flows for 25 sub-Saharan African countries,  1970-1996 
(3-year moving averages ; million 1996 US $)
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